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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY

A tangled story of a little-used country graveyard appears in
the report of the case of Smith v. Ladage.1 Land had there been
conveyed to named grantees as "Trustees of the Brush Creek
Burying Ground," and to their successors, without any limitation
or restriction other than might be inferred from the descriptive
words attached to the grantees' names. Occasional burials occurred from 1848 to 1922, subsequent to which time the cemetery
fell into disrepair and became overgrown with weeds, vines and
brush. In 1940, the defendants acquired title to the quarter-section of land from which the cemetery had been carved and thereafter, dealing with the township officials, obtained passage of a
vacation ordinance on condition the defendants would remove all
bodies and provide for the re-interment thereof in a nearby cemetery at their own expense. Upon completion of these conditions, a
quit-claim deed covering the cemetery site was given to defendants
and was duly recorded. Thereafter suit was brought by persons
who claimed an interest in the property, either by quit-claim from
the heirs of one of the original grantees 2 or as relatives of persons
buried in the cemetery, to prevent desecration of the burial ground.
A decree dismissing the suit was reversed because the court failed
to find proper compliance with the provisions of Section 1 of an
"Act to provide for the removal of cemeteries, ' 8 in that (1) the
assent of the trustees or persons controlling the cemetery had
not been obtained, and (2) there was no showing of "good cause"
for the removal as the evidence failed to indicate any danger to
public health or welfare. Mere neglect was not regarded sufficient
to constitute either abandonment or justification for the vacation
ordinance.
1397 Ill. 336, 74 N. E. (2d) 497 (1947).
2 The court decided the conveyance vested no title since the estate of the deceased trustee, he being one of joint trustees, passed to the survivor of the grantees
rather than to the heirs applying the rule laid down in Reichert v. Missouri & Illinois
Coal Co., 231 Ill. 238, 83 N. E. 166, 121 Am. St. Rept. 307 (1907).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 21, § 2.
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A typical conveyance frequently made during the early days
of this state, particularly by those interested in establishing school
facilities, would run to school trustees "so long as the same shall
be used for school purposes." The estate thereby created, being
a fee simple determinable, would automatically end upon the clear
happening of the contingency 4 and no reconveyance would be
necessary to restore the title to the grantor or his heirs. A natural consequence thereof would be that any improvements made
on the property would also pass to the grantor. It was on this
theory that the plaintiff, in Hackett v. School Trustees,5 sought an
injunction to restrain the school officials from selling the improvements to strangers after the premises were abandoned for school
purposes. Relief was denied, however, when the court, on examination of the conveyance determined that, by reason of its
peculiar language, a fee simple absolute estate had been granted
with the reservation of an option to repurchase the soil only,
exercisable in case an abandonment should occur. Exercise of the
option entitled the successor in title to the grantor to no more
than a conveyance of the land without the buildings.
It has sometimes been said that no word in Anglo-American
law has more varied and disputed meanings than the word "heir."I
Two more illustrations of that fact are to be found in the reported
decisions. Instances of the creation of estates tail in Illinois,
particularly by deed, are rather rare, hence the case of Bibo v.
Bibo6 possesses some significance. The grantor there concerned,
owner of a fee simple estate, conveyed the premises to his son
"and his bodily heirs." The grantor died some time thereafter
leaving a will bequeathing his entire estate, including all property
"to which I am entitled or which I may have the power to dispose
of at my death," to his wife. After the grantor's death, the
grantee also died without ever having had any issue but leaving a
wife surviving who was likewise named as sole devisee and legatee
4 See Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church v. Parker, 373 Il.
(2d) 522 (1940).
5 398 Ill. 27, 74 N. E. (2d) 869 (1947).

6

397 Ii1. 505, 74 N. E. (2d) 808 (1947).

607, 27 N. E.
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under the grantee's will. In a suit to determine the title to the
premises, the grantee's widow claimed either that her husband
held a fee simple title or, if not, that at least he held a contingent
remainder in a portion of the premises which, upon the death of
his father, became vested in the grantee, the interest then passing
to his widow. The first argument proceeded on the theory that
the words "his bodily heirs" were words of purchase but, there
being no persons in esse to take, were to be treated as a nullity
thereby resulting in the named grantee receiving a fee simple
since a conveyance to a named person, no other limitation appearing, creates that type of estate. 7 The court held, however, that the
phrase was one of limitation suitable to the creation of a fee tail
at common law and, under the present Illinois law, gave the first
taker only a life estate. 8 The second contention was overcome by
noting that, after the creation of a fee tail estate, the grantor is
regarded as retaining a reversionary interest which may be effectively devised by the grantor's will. For these reasons, the
grantor's widow was held entitled to the estate.
By contrast, in Gridley v. Gridley,9 the testator devised an
estate in trust for the benefit of his daughter for life with remainder to the "heirs of her body" and, in default of such heirs,
to the heirs of the testator's body then living. Here, however,
the problem concerned not so much the existence of the reversion upon default of issue of the life tenant as the identity
of the persons described by the phrase "heirs of the testator's
body then living." It was held that the term had to be construed
literally, i.e. as referring to those who would, at the time of the
testator's death, have succeeded to the decedent's intestate estate.
Such a rule of construction is admittedly subject to modification
where the testator's words indicate that some other meaning is
intended, but the court found not such basis for varying the construction and the property in question was held to go to the personal representatives of the life tenant as the sole heir of the
Ch. 30, § 12.
8 Ibid., § 5.
9 399 Ill. 215, 77 N. E. (2d) 146 (1948).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
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testator at the time of his death. Both the Bibo and the Gridley
cases appear to have been taken to the Illinois Supreme Court in
the hope of persuading the court to extend the liberal construction
of the term "heirs" that had been applied in Albers v. Donovan °
and in Hauser v. Power.". The court, however, plainly showed it
was not disposed to extend these modifications to new situations.
Another fertile source of controversy in the law of future
interests has always been in the creation of interests that arise
upon a death "without issue." The case of Hull v. Adams 1 2 concerned such a testamentary gift of a farm to the testator's daughter for life with a gift over to the "legal heirs" of the testator
in the event of the daughter's death without issue. When the life
tenant, the testator's only child, died without leaving issue, the
estate was claimed by a nephew of the testator as the "legal heir."
However, the executor of the estate of the testator's daughter was
judged to have the better claim since he represented the person
who was the testator's legal heir at the time of the testator's
death. Thus, again, was affirmed the rule held controlling in the
Gridley case, that the word "heirs" is presumed to intend those
persons who are the heirs of the testator at the time of his death,
unless it is plainly apparent that the testator intended to refer to
those who would be his heirs had he died at the termination of
the life estate. In this respect, therefore, the case of Himmel v.
Himmel13 is still to be regarded as the leading decision in Illinois.
One more decision, that in Chicago Title &VTrust Company v.
Shellaberger,'4 might be noted for it concerns the familiar problem of reconciling the rule against perpetuities with the desire
to keep family fortunes intact as long as possible. Actually, the
decision introduces no new law but it does tend somewhat to
clarify the court's much criticized holding in Corwin v. Rheims. 15
10371

Il. 458, 21 N. E. (2d) 563 (1939).

11356 fl. 521, 191 N. E. 64 (1934).

12399 Ill.
13294 Ill.
14399 Ill.
15 390 Ill.
47-9, 34 Ill.

347, 77 N. E. (2d) 706 (1948).
557, 128 N. E. 641 (1920).
320, 77 N. E. (2d) 675 (1948).
205, 61 N. E. (2d) 40 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
B. Journ. 21, 40 Ill. L. Rev. 404, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 300.
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Specifically, the problem was whether the interests of remaindermen could be regarded as vested even though there was no immediate right to possession of the interest whenever and however
the preceding supporting estate was terminated. In the Shellaberger trust agreement, the measuring lives for the duration of
the trust were selected partly from two generations, that is from
among the trustees under the original agreement and from among
the grandchildren then living of the settlors. During the life of
the trust, the income from the corpus went to the settlor and certain other named beneficiaries and, at the termination of the measuring lives, it was provided that there should be a distribution
among the heirs of the settlor and certain other life tenants. It
was contended that, under such an arrangement, some of the heirs
of those in the first generation who served as measuring lives
might not be ascertained until more than twenty-one years after
that measuring life was determined, thereby involving a violation
of the rule against perpetuities. The argument was based on the
holding in Corwin v. Rheims, which had declared that, in determining whether vesting occurred within the period of a life in
being plus twenty-one years, the "life in being" could only refer
to the life of the preceding taker of the interest to which the
remainderman would eventually be entitled to succeed. Applying
that ruling to the Shellaberger trust, it was contended that if the
heirs of the first-generation takers were not to be ascertained until
the time of distribution, which would occur at the death of the
second-generation taker, it might just be possible that one of the
heirs of the first generation measuring life would not have been
born more than twenty-one years after the death of such measuring life. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, did not follow the
suggested interpretation of the holding in Corwin v. Rheims, but
rather pointed out that the fatal defects in the prior situation
were attributable to other grounds. 16 Instead, it held that, under
the Shellaberger trust, the heirs of those who served as the first
generation measuring lives were to be regarded as ascertained at
16 See 399 IlM.320 at 340, 77 N. E. (2d) 675 at 684.
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the moment of the expiration of such lives, and that postponement
of the right of possession for such heirs until the expiration of
the second generation measuring lives did not serve to make the
interests of those heirs in any sense as non-vested. Postponement
of enjoyment was regarded as being for the convenience of the
estate rather than for reasons personal to the ultimate distributees.
Only one case may be said to have any bearing on the rights
of purchasers. A suit for specific performance of a contract for
the sale of land is essentially an action in personam, hence the
court must, of necessity, have personal jurisdiction over the vendor
in order to be able to enter a binding decree. If the vendor, when
ordered to convey, willingly executes the deed to the purchaser,
it matters not that the land involved happens to lie outside of
the state for the proceeding is not one in rem.1 7 There is serious
doubt, however, if the court would have power to direct one of its
officials, such as a master in chancery, to execute the conveyance
if the vendor refused to comply with the decree, for the foreign
state, in which the land is located, would be under no obligation
to give full faith and credit to the decree or to the acts done thereunder.1 s Such being the case, there is some occasion to wonder if
the plaintiff, in the case of Brown v. Jurczak,19 may not have obtained a hollow victory in having a decree dismissing his suit for
specific performance reversed inasmuch as the land involved was
located in the State of Michigan, even though the Illinois court
had obtained personal jurisdiction over the parties.
Some cases concerning issues arising under the law of personal property deserve attention. In the first of these cases, that
of Schoen v. Wallace,20 the owner of a fur coat sued the furrier to
recover for the loss thereof while in the furrier's hands for storage. By way of defense, the bailee pleaded an agreement in the
17 Cloud v. Greasley, 125 Ill. 313, 17 N. E. 826 (1888); Baker v. Rockabrand,
118 Ill. 365, 8 N. E. 456 (1886).
18 See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65 (1909).
The same
thing may well be true of an act done by a trustee appointed for the purpose:
West v. Fitz, 109 Ill. 425 (1884).
19 397 Ill. 532, 74 N. E. (2d) 821 (1947).
20334 Ill. App. 294, 78 N. E. (2d) 801 (1948).
Leave to appeal has been denied.
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storage receipt designed to limit the measure of recovery in case
It
of loss from any cause, "including our own negligence."
appeared that the owner carried insurance on the property for
her own account and, at the time of receipt, it was agreed that
the bailment charge would be reduced accordingly. The plaintiff's
claim that the agreement to reduce liability was a nullity, since it
was not proper to contract to relieve the bailee from his own fraud
or neglect, was overruled on the theory that (1) there was no
showing of fraud, and (2) it was proper for private parties to
stipulate as to the measure of recovery, even for neglect, in consideration of a reduction in the storage charge. In Meyer v.
Rozran,21 however, the bailee succeeded in eliminating all liability
for loss of the bailed articles, even though the agreement fixed a
maximum limit for recovery, because he was able to show that the
loss occurred without fault and by reason of the criminal acts of
third persons. Plaintiff had sued on the theory that defendant
was a common carrier or, if not, was at least guilty of unnecessary
delay in making delivery, hence had subjected the goods to an
additional risk. The court found, on the contrary, that defendant
was an ordinary bailee for hire, being only a contract carrier,
and further had acted with every possible precaution when he
found it impossible to make delivery to the consignees because
of the intervention of a holiday between time of receipt and time
of attempted delivery.
22
A logical extension of the holding in Phillips v. W.G.N., IiW.,
which dealt with common law rights of an author of an uncopyrighted radio serial script, has been made in the case of Morton
v. Raphael.23 The plaintiff therein, a commercial artist, had been
hired to paint certain murals on the walls of a public dining room
in a Chicago hotel. The defendant, engaged to do the interior
decorating of the premises, subsequently took photographs of the
completed installation, incidentally revealing plaintiff's handiwork, and published the same in conjunction with an advertiseI. App. 301, 77 N. E. (2d) 454 (1948).
307 Ill. App. 1, 29 N. E. (2d) 849 (1940).
23 334 Il. App. 399, 79 N. E. (2d) 522 (1948).
21333
22
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ment of defendant's business which appeared in a trade paper.
It was claimed by plaintiff that such reproduction, without her
permission, amounted to a violation of her common law copyright.
The court, however, held that, if copyright were possible, there
had been a dedication to the public domain inasmuch as the finished product had been exposed to unrestricted public view, but
even if not, the plaintiff could have no right therein for the work
had been done at the commission of the hotel proprietor, hence
the copyright, if any, would belong to him in the absence of any
reservation by the artist.
The power of the sovereign state to act to abate a nuisance
may not be questioned but if, in order so to do, it becomes necessary to seize and destroy personal property there is occasion to
consider whether the seizure can be justified without notice and
hearing to the owner or possessor,2 4 except in cases where the
object is small in value and the cost of a condemnation proceeding
would outweigh the worth of the thing destroyed while abating the
nuisance. 25 Obviously, however, the right of seizure can be justified only provided the object seized is then involved in conduct
which has. been clearly declared to be a nuisance requiring summary abatement. It was for this reason that the Illinois Supreme
Court, in CoX v. Cox, 26 reversed a judgment dismissing a suit
brought by the owner and possessor of certain fish nets which had
been seized and destroyed by state officials for an alleged violation
of the Fish Code. The statute in question condemned the "use"
of such nets and authorized summary proceedings for the destruction of nets .so illegally used, but it was held that the provisions
thereof could not be regarded as applicable to a case where nets
of that character were merely possessed and stored in Illinois
when not in operation in waters outside the territorial area of
the state.
24

People v. Marquis, 291 Ill. 121, 125 N. E. 757, 8 A. L. R. 874 (1920).

25 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894).

Direct appeal to the Supreme Court
26400 Ill. 291, 79 N. E. (2d) 497 (1948).
was proper inasmuch as the constitutionality of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 56, § 109,
was directly involved. That statute was repealed in 1947 and was not re-enacted
at the time of the adoption of the present Fish Code: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch.
56, § 141 et seq.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT

The case of Sandra Frocks, Inc. v. Zif, 2 7 companion to a case
of similar name noted in last year's survey which dealt with the
propriety of serving a notice of termination of tenancy by registered mail, 28 merits attention, but this time that attention is
directed to the question of whether or not a tenant may insist
upon performance of an option to purchase, contained in the
lease, at a time when he is in default in rent and the landlord has
exercised his right to terminate the lease. The plaintiff there had
filed suit for specific performance of the option agreement as
well as for an injunction halting the suit for possession. In affirming a judgment for the defendant, the Illinois Supreme Court
agreed that the notice sent plaintiff terminating the lease for nonpayment of rent also put an end to any other rights plaintiff may
have asserted under the lease, including the option to purchase.
If the suit had been one at law, a discussion of dependent and
independent covenants might have been in order but as the case
was in equity, equitable principles prevailed.
Incorporation by reference was involved in 7039 Wentworth
Avenue Building Corporationv. Trough,2 9 which case raised the
problem as to whether or not certain rules and regulations set
out on the reverse side of a lease were to be treated as a part of
the terms thereof, there being a clause within the body of the lease
adopting them by reference. The Appellate Court, declaring that
the same rules were applicable to the construction of leases as
were applicable to other contracts and noting that a contract
might consist of several documents internally connected, held
the rules and regulations were a part of the lease and binding on
the tenant.
The effect of successive notices for the termination of a ten0 The facts there
ancy was involved in Mitchell v. Tyler.3
showed
27 397 I1. 497, 74 N. E. (2d) 699 (1947).
28 See note to Ziff v. Sandra Frocks, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 353, 73 N. E.
(1947), in 26 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 71 and 348-52.

29 332 Ii1. App. 635, 76 N. E. (2d) 350 (1947).
30335 Ill.
App. 117, 80 N. E. (2d) 449 (1948).

(2d)
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that plaintiff, the landlord, had served a notice of termination of
tenancy on the defendant and had then proceeded to a favorable
decision in forcible entry and detainer proceedings based thereon.
The defendant appealed from that judgment asserting the invalidity of the notice and, while the appeal was pending, the plaintiff
then served a sixty-day notice of termination of tenancy upon the
defendant against the possibility that the judgment might be
reversed on appeal. The tenant then claimed, through a petition
in the nature of a writ of audita querela, that the plaintiff had
thereby waived the first notice and had nullified the action taken
thereon. Each party cited an Illinois case to support his contention. The Appellate Court distinguished the two cases; the one
holding the first notice was waived being a case where the second
notice demanded the payment of accrued rent,3 ' whereas in the
other, in which two notices were served on the same day, the
second notice was only a precautionary device to protect the lessor
should the first notice be held insufficient. 2 Relief was denied the
tenant in the instant case when the court noted that the defendant
could not have been misled and should have realized that the only
purpose of the second notice was to save the lessor additional
time in the event the appeal was determined in the tenant's favor.
Sharp distinctions exist between the relationship of landlord
and tenant on the one hand and that of innkeeper and guest on
the other; especially with regard to eviction for non-payment of
rent. In Neely v. Lott Hotels Company,3 3 the Appellate Court
held that where a person occupies accommodations in an hotel,
paying a daily rate and receiving general maid service, towels,
linens and the like, even though the suite should consist of three
rooms, the relationship was that of innkeeper and guest. For failure on the part of the guest to pay the daily charge, the hotel
proprietor had the right summarily to eject the guest from the
premises, using whatever force was reasonably necessary. The
App. 44 (1890).
Jones v. Ritter, 206 IMl. App. 487 (1917).
33334 Ill. App. 91, 78 N. E. (2d) 659 (1948).
31 Dockrill v. Scherk, 37 Ii1.
32
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case would appear to be lacking in novelty except for the fact that
the court was unable to cite any local precedent on the point.
To prevent overcrowding of facilities, the typical apartment
lease contains two stipulations, one to the effect that the premises
shall be occupied only by the lessee and a second limiting occupancy for private dwelling purposes only. In Liberty National
Bank of Chicago v. Zimmerman,3 4 the landlord sought to recover
possession for an alleged violation of these covenants. The
Appellate Court held, however, that the lessee's daughter, son-inlaw, and their child were entitled to occupy the premises with the
lessee, for a search of authoritative sources revealed that persons
of that relationship are included within the concept of a "family"
while a private dwelling is one usually occupied not alone by the
lessee but also by his family.
A case apparently of first impression in Illinois, that of Kruse
v. Ballsmith,3 5 arose out of rent regulations imposed under the
OPA Act. The court there decided that if a landlord, entitled
to possession of his own premises for his own use, obtains a certificate from the Rent Director permitting eviction proceedings
to be brought and complies with all other statutory regulations, the
general provisions of the rent regulations then become inapplicable
and the landlord may thereafter proceed under local laws as if
the Emergency Price Control Act were not in effect. The case
involved the right of the landlord to demand double rent under
the local statute for the period of wrongful withholding. It was
adjudged that the penalty might be awarded to him without violating the rent regulations or causing the tenant to pay excess
rent.
Two cases involving oil leases merit some attention. The
first, that of Guth v. Texas Company, 6 involved an oil and gas
lease under which plaintiff held a royalty interest. He brought
action to recover royalties on wet casing-head gas which the
34 333 111. App. 94, 77 N. E. (2d) 49 (1947).
35 332 Il. App. 301, 75 N. E. (2d) 140 (1947).
36163 F. (2d) 893 (1947).
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defendant had permitted to escape.
It appeared from the
evidence therein that such gas is gas that is intermingled with
the oil in the pool and serves as the force which drives the oil to
the surface. It is necessary to build a refinery to make the gas
economically useful, but the defendant, rather than wait until a
refinery could be constructed, permitted the gas to escape although
it did collect the oil. Justification for failure to wait until a
refinery could be built was said to rest in the fact that competing
producers were withdrawing gas and oil from the same pool. The
plaintiff, claiming that the defendant had reduced the gas to possession and then permitted it to escape, felt that defendant should
pay royalties thereon. The court, however, decided that defendant's possession was not such as would make it liable, for defendant had no way to contain or control the gas.
The other case, that of Ramsey v. Carter Oil Company,37 was
an action to enjoin the defendant, lessee-operator of oil and gas
wells on plaintiff's land, from converting an offset well to a repressure well. The federal district court involved formulated
some of the duties of the defendant by noting that such a tenant
(1) is obliged to use reasonable diligence to develop the premises
so long as the enterprise could be carried on at a reasonable profit;
(2) should, by appropriate measures, protect the leasehold against
drainage by offset wells; (3) ought to develop the property and
produce oil in the manner of a reasonably prudent operator, having due regard for the interest not only of himself but also that
of the lessor; and (4) had the right and duty to adopt gas repressuring systems for secondary recovery of oil. But, since it
was shown that converting an offset well into a repressuring well
would result in the loss of all the oil under five acres of ground,
the court felt that a reasonably prudent operator, having in mind
the best interests of the lessor, would not adopt the proposed
plan. It, therefore, granted the plaintiff an injunction against the
contemplated conduct.

37 74 F. Supp. 481 (1947).
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SEOURITY TRANSACTIONS

General doctrines concerning security for money loaned or
credit extended have gone unchanged, but two small points have
been considered concerning rights of mortgagees. If any intimation was gleaned from the action taken by the Illinois Supreme
Court when reversing the holding of the Appellate Court in the
case of Stevens v. Blue,38 to the effect that once a receiver has been
appointed for mortgaged premises the benefit of the receivership
redounds to the favor of all mortgagees holding liens thereon, the
same should have been effectively dispelled by the more recent
decision in the case of Fleischer v. Flick.3 9 A substantial sum of
net rents had there been accumulated in the hands of a receiver
appointed at the instance of a first mortgagee who later consented
to the dismissal of his suit. On application by the owner of the
equity of redemption for the payment of such balance, a junior
encumbrancer contended the money should be applied toward the
satisfaction of the junior lien pursuant to a pledge of the rents as
additional security. His request was denied because the assignment was held not to be self-operating and he had done nothing
to have the receivership extended for his benefit.
The case of Illinois Bankers Life Assurance Company v.
Dunas40 also serves as a reminder that persons seeking to foreclose mortgages can do so effectively only if the court can secure
jurisdiction over all interested parties, particularly in the capacity
in which they bear relation to the property involved. 41 If possession of the mortgaged premises is acquired under such an invalid
foreclosure, however, the lapse of time will not serve to bar a
later suit to eliminate the equity of redemption held by the
42
unserved defendants, no matter how long a time may elapse,
38 388 Ill. 92, 57 N. E. (2d) 451 (1944), reversing 320 Ill. App. 375, 51 N. E. (2d)
603 (1943).
39334 Ill. App. 461, 80 N. E. (2d) 81 (1948). Leave to appeal has been denied.
40333 InI. App. 192, 77 N. E. (2d) 54 (1948).
41 In the original foreclosure proceeding there concerned, jurisdiction was obtained by personal service on certain defendants but as individuals rather than
in their capacity as trustees under the last will of the deceased owner.
42 Suits on mortgages are usually barred in ten years after the maturity of the
debt, according to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 11.
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for in that case it was held proper for the mortgagee in possession to seek to re-foreclose and to obtain an injunction against a
suit in ejectment brought by the owner of the right to redeem
despite the claim that the mortgagee's rights were destroyed by
the passage of time. Mention might also be made here of the
case of Hartsman v. Kaind14 3 which touches on the question of
necessary parties in foreclosure proceedings. It was there held
to be the law that while the mortgagee must generally verify
whether or not a junior judgment creditor has made an assignment of the judgment and, if so, must name the assignee as a
party, that rule does not apply where the land is registered under
the Torrens System and no notation of the assignment has been
made on the Torrens register.
WILIS AND ADMINISTRATION.

Cases involving the law of wills seem to run principally to
problems concerning the existence of defects in the attempt to
create an enforcible testamentary instrument. Lack of mental
capacity to properly perform a testamentary act has always been
such a popular basis for contesting wills that most courts have
limited the scope of this defect in order to prevent its wholesale
abuse. So, in Illinois, it has been held that only where a testator is afflicted with an insane delusion is he mentally incompetent to dispose of his estate by testamentary instrument. The
leading exposition of that rule has, for over forty years, been
44
the case of Owen v. Crumbaugh.
In applying this limitation, however, the courts have been
under constant pressure to include all manner of other types of
influence within the scope of incompetency. So, in Jackman v.
North,4 5 where a will contest was based on an unusually bitter
but actually unfounded hatred held by the testatrix for the con43 400 Inl. 243, 79 N. E. (2d) 472 (1948). A more complete discussion of this
case appears ante. See section on Civil Practice and Procedure, particularly enforcement of judgments.
44 228 Ill. 380, 81 N. E. 1044 (1907).
45398 Ill. 90, 75 N. E. (2d) 324 (1947).
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testant, her sister, it was shown by the testimony of two medical experts that the mind of the testatrix was dominated by this
hatred at the time when the will was executed. On this, plus
other non-expert testimony to the effect that the belief upon
which the hate of the testatrix had been founded was in fact baseless, the contestant rested her case. A directed verdict admitting the will to probate was questioned on appeal, but the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed and pointed out that the contestant
had "bypassed the primary question and ignored the necessity
of making proof that the testatrix was suffering from an insane
delusion in regard to the plaintiff.' '46 It might have been, the
court indicated, that the dislike for the sister influenced the
testatrix in the making of her will but, if such prejudice could
be accounted for on any other ground than a truly insane delusion, she was not disqualified from making a will.
The existence of a dislike or prejudice against a relative is
no ground for setting aside a will unless it could be said that
the dislike rested on a belief in something impossible either in
the nature of things or under the circumstances surrounding the
afflicted individual, which belief must also be unyielding either to
evidence or reason. Nothing in the plaintiff's expert testimony
was said to shed light on this particular aspect of the testatrix'
frame of mind. The case seems to be as good an illustration as
usually appears of the difficulty of attempting to prove mental
incapacity by expert testimony based on hypothetical questions.
Since most will contests depend, for success, on the proof of unreasonableness in the testator's belief under the particular circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, it is difficult
to imagine a case where, under the law of this state, expert testimony could prove mental incompetency.
Proof of undue influence, where a fiduciary relationship exists between the testator and a devisee who receives a substantial benefit from the will, is likewise difficult to establish in fact.
Generally, prima facie proof of such undue influence is made by
46 398 Ill. 90 at 100, 75 N. E. (2d) 324 at 329.
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establishing the fact of a confidential relationship and a will actually favoring the confidante. It then remains for the proponent
of the will to produce a preponderance of evidence favoring regularity. Such a problem arose in Tidholn v. Tidho m, 47 when
an eighty-six year old widower executed a will leaving practically his entire estate to a daughter. The testator's son, contestant therein, showed that the testator had lived with his daughter, had been dependent upon her, and had reposed trust and confidence in her. Evidence having been produced to show that the
testator's freedom of action was actually not destroyed at the
time of execution of the will, the case was given to the jury on
instructions that, in order for undue influence to have the effect
of invalidating a will, the influence had to be directly connected
with the execution of the will, had to be operating at the time it
was made, had to be directed toward the procuring of the will in
favor of certain parties, and had to so destroy the testator's
freedom of action as to render the instrument more the will of
another than his own. The instructions were approved. The
test suggested is not new but is remarkable here to illustrate the
consistency with which the court has acted in such matters.
Where separate papers are offered for probate and not all
are executed and attested according to the statute, the law of
wills restricts incorporation by reference to situations in which,
first, the will itself refers to the papers to be incorporated as
being in existence at the time of execution of the will and uses
suitable language to reasonably identify the extrinsic papers and
show the testator's intention to make such incorporation, and
second, it must be shown that the papers to be incorporated were,
in fact, in existence at the time of the execution of the will. In
Wagner v. Clausen,48 probate was sought for a letter found with
the testatrix' will on the theory that it had been incorporated
by reference in the third clause of the will, which read: "All the
rest, residue and remainder of my property . . . I give, de47 397 Ill.
363, 74 N. E. (2d) 514 (1947).
48 399 Il. 403, 78 N. E. (2d) 203 (1948).
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vise and bequeath to Katherine Clausen, as trustee for the purpose of converting it into cash and making distribution thereof
in accordance with a memorandum of instructions prepared by
me and delivered to her." Looking at the facts closely, the court
found two points of weakness in the case for incorporation in
that (1) the memorandum was dated five days after the date of
the will, and (2) had actually never been out of the control of
the testatrix but had been placed in an envelope addressed to
the trustee and left in the testatrix' safety deposit box. With
the memorandum unenforcible, the court then had to face the
claims of the beneficiaries named in the memorandum, who urged
that a constructive trust be recognized, and of Katherine Clausen,
who urged that, by failure of the trust, the residue should come
to her individually as a gift. Both claims were rejected in view
of the clear intention of the testatrix that the residue of her estate was to be disposed of by trust. As the trust failed, the only
alternative was intestacy.
The problem of revocation of mutual wills was raised by the
case of Jordan v. McGrew4 9 where the evidence disclosed that a
husband and wife had made mutual wills and thereafter, subsequent to the husband's death, the wife attempted to destroy her
will by burning. The problem was troublesome because Illinois
has precedents holding that, where two testators execute a joint
and mutual will, revocation is improper because such an instrument is said to show on its face that the devises are made in consideration of each other.5 0 On the other hand, the time tested
maxim has been that only clear and conclusive evidence of an
exchange of consideration, over and beyond the mere existence
of mutual wills, should be sufficient to destroy the right to revoke. 51 In the instant case, those seeking to thwart the attempt
to revoke produced witnesses who testified to the fact of a verbal
agreement between the husband and wife whereby, in consideration of what the beneficiary had done and was to do in helping
49400 111. 275, 79 N. E. (2d) 622 (1948).
50 See Frazier Y. Patterson, 243 I1. 80, 90 N. E. 216 (1909).
51 Frese v. Meyer, 392 I1. 59, 63 N. E. (2d) 768 (1945).
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them, they would make their mutual wills giving the said beneficiary their property. When it was further shown that the beneficiary had, in fact, performed the assistance contemplated, the
proof was deemed sufficient to make the wills irrevocable.
In the field of estate administration, there were few developments of significance although in Brandt v. Phipps5 2 the court
found it necessary to reiterate the rule concerning the interest
in real estate acquired by an executor to whom no devise is made
but who is directed to sell and convey the land and apply the
proceeds to specified purposes. The court again held that the
executor takes only the power of sale, not the fee, unless vesting
of the fee is necessary to effectuate the intention of the testator. It was also held that if the power of sale is not exercised
within a reasonable time it will lapse, the title necessarily descending to the heirs at law. The holding should set at rest
doubts on the question which may previously have existed because of views expressed in prior cases tending to indicate that
the executor who is directed to sell and convey takes an estate
in the land. 3 In the instant case, the executor sued to set aside
his executor's deed, made some nine years after the will had
been admitted to probate, on the ground that he was mentally
incompetent at the time the deed was made. The evidence abundantly established the fact of incompetency but the court, affirming
a dismissal of the executor's suit, pointed out that the power
was not exercised during the two years of administration by
plaintiff's predecessor nor during the three years of plaintiff's
own administration preceding his incompetency, and consequently
had lapsed. The executor's deed being a nullity, the decision
on this point made it unnecessary to make any pronouncement on
the validity or invalidity of the acts of mentally incompetent
executors.
In Clark v. Bentley,5 4 the court further evidenced its dispo52398 Il1. 296, 75 N. E. (2d) 757 (1947).
53 Grove v. Willard, 280 IlM. 247, 117 N. E. 489 (1917); Lash v. Lash, 209 Ill.
595, 70 N. E. 1049 (1904); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 178 Ill. 387, 53 N. E. 101

(1899).

54398 Ill. 535, 76 N. E. (2d) 438 (1948).
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sition to continue to construe "no contest" provisions in wills
so as to avoid forfeiture of a beneficiary's interest in the estate,
if that result can possibly be achieved. Testator's children, being contingent remaindermen, quit-claimed their interest to the
testator's widow, who was the lifetenant, and she, in return, conveyed undivided interests in the rents and profits to the children. Part of the real estate was subsequently conveyed to purchasers. Plaintiff in the action, one of testator's grandchildren
who had been given a cash legacy, contended that the conveyances between the widow and children, operating to change the
terms of the will, 55 had worked a forfeiture of the property
involved. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether
''no contest" provisions in wills are contrary to public policy,
holding instead that the testator contemplated not some amicable
composition of the estate but some form of court or judicial contest. The soundness of the decision is scarcely open to question.
To adopt the construction urged by the plaintiff would certainly
force the present to submit to the dead hand of the past.
An interesting question of evidence law was presented in
George v. Moorehead,56 a will contest case, where a transcript of
testimony taken in heirship proceedings was held inadmissible,
there being no showing that the witnesses were dead or unavailable. The court pointed out that while prior testimony may be
received if the witnesses are dead, insane, under restraint, or
otherwise not available, provided the parties and the issues are
substantially the same, that rule was of no help in the instant
case. It is clear that the issues could not be the same for a
hearing to determine heirship in no way involves the validity of
a will, which issue is the prime one in a will contest case.
Mention perhaps ought to be made of the erstwhile holding
55 The claim was based on a provision in the will which read: "If any of my
children, or grandchildren, or any of the cestui que trust under this will shall
contest the validity of this, my will, or attempt to vacate the same, or alter or
change any of the provisions thereof, he, or she, or they, shall be thereby deprived
.
of any beneficial interest under this will, and of any share of my estate ..
Italics added.
56 399 Ill. 497, 78 N. E. (2d) 216 (1948).
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of the Appellate Court for the First District in the case of Weil
v. Levy.5 7 The court there indicated that a petition to sell decedent's real estate to pay debts was not barred by laches, even
though filed thirteen years after decedent's death, provided it
was filed within seven years following the granting of letters of
administration. The decision apparently contradicts the leading
Illinois cases on the point," and does not follow the rule now
prescribed by a recent amendment to the Probate Act. 59 As it
does not appear that reason dictates a change from the rule customarily applied, the action of the court in withdrawing the
opinion is to be commended.
VII. PUBLIC LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

As was the case last year, the decision attracting the most
public interest was that achieved by the United States Supreme
Court in the McCollum case,' which tribunal, by a divided court,
2
voted to reverse the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court.
The case, as is now well known, turned upon the right of the
public school authorities to permit religious instruction on school
premises under a "released time" arrangement. The majority
were of the opinion that the plan pursued fell squarely under
the ban of the First Amendment, as interpreted in Everson v.
Board of Education of Ewing Township,3 and violated the "wall
of separation" between state and church. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reed, however, clearly points out the futility of
supposing there can be such a separation so long as the two
exist side by side. Interaction between the two is inevitable, so
57332 Ill. App. (adv.) 468, 76 N. E. (2d) 192 (1947).
The opinion was later
withdrawn by order of court: 76 N. E. (2d)- Xv.
B. J. 426.
58 See cases cited In a criticism of the decision in 36 Ill.
59 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 3, § 379.
1- U. S. -, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. (adv.) 451 (1948).
2 See People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N. E. (2d)
161 (1947), noted in 26 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 100-1, 35 Ill. B. J. 361.
3 330 U. S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1946).

